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I. Introduction
President Donald Trump contends that federal appellate court
appointments constitute his foremost success. The president and
the United States Senate Grand Old Party (GOP) majority have
compiled records by approving forty-eight conservative, young,
accomplished, overwhelmingly Caucasian, and predominantly
male, appeals court jurists. However, their appointments have
exacted a toll, particularly on the ninety-four district courts around
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the country that must address eighty-seven open judicial positions
in 677 posts.
One riveting example is New York’s multiple tribunals, which
confront twelve vacancies among fifty-two court slots. The
Administrative Office of the United States Courts considers nine
of these openings “judicial emergencies,” because they have been
protracted and involve substantial caseloads. Despite that
pressing situation, Trump failed to propose any candidate before
May 2018 and did not appoint a single jurist for a New York vacant
district court position until October 2019. Indeed, eleven of
thirteen openings lacked nominees until recently, mostly because
prior to this May, President Trump delayed resending the upper
chamber seven of eight nominees whom the White House astutely
tapped last year.
District judges comprise the federal justice system’s
workhorses in New York and resolve voluminous filings, while the
myriad vacancies pressure New York jurists and litigants,
conditions which epitomize the circumstances in jurisdictions
throughout the United States. Thus, the attempts to fill the
openings by Trump, the chamber and the home state
politicians—Democrats Chuck Schumer, the Minority Leader, and
Kirsten Gillibrand—necessitate assessment.
This piece first recounts the background of the court
appointments issue, stressing modern concerns. Part two surveys
the practices of Trump and the chamber, detecting that both the
president and the Republican Senate majority emphasize rapidly
appointing conservative, young appellate judges but downplay
vacancies in trial court positions. The chief executive also eschews
revered customs, including assiduous consultation of senators
from jurisdictions that experience openings, which predecessors
had used. The section then analyzes the confirmation procedures,
ascertaining that the Judiciary Committee deemphasizes salutary
traditions, principally the “blue slip” policy—which stops
processing unless home state legislators approve candidates—and
the careful arrangement of hearings that previous committees had
rigorously applied.
Segment three considers the detrimental impacts of numerous
practices, determining that until recently more appellate court and
district court vacancies as well as judicial emergencies existed
than when President Trump assumed office. Stressing fast

NEW YORK FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT VACANCIES

3

confirmation of abundant conservative appeals court jurists and
deviating from venerable precedents—notably reliance on
meticulous consultation and blue slips that had long performed
efficaciously—seemingly undercut presidential discharge of the
constitutional responsibilities to nominate and confirm plentiful
impressive judges and senatorial fulfillment of the constitutional
duties to advise and consent respecting nominees for the
voluminous openings. Moreover, the prolonged nature and colossal
quantity of empty trial level seats undermine the judiciary’s
compelling responsibility to promptly, inexpensively, and fairly
treat massive dockets.
The last section proffers constructive suggestions for future
judicial selection. Now that the president has renominated the
seven excellent, mainstream nominees, who decisively earned
committee votes, the White House should meaningfully consult the
New York lawmakers while revitalizing mechanisms from which
presidents and senators have derived consummate benefit to fill
all twelve of New York’s unoccupied posts. The Senate must revive
efficacious measures, primarily appeals court slips, robust
hearings and committee discussions, and rigorous confirmation
debates. These endeavors should offer an instructive path for the
entire country.
II. Contemporary Selection Difficulties
The history needs comparatively little review; many observers
have examined this background and the current situation enjoys
greater pertinence. 1 One salient attribute is the persistent
vacancies dilemma, which results from enlarged federal court
jurisdiction, filings, and judicial slots. 2 The other feature, the
1. See, e.g., Gordon Bermant, Jeffrey Hennemuth & Fletcher Mangum,
Judicial Vacancies: An Examination of the Problem and Possible Solutions, 14
MISS. C. L. REV. 319, 319 (1994) (analyzing, and suggesting solutions to remedy,
excessive federal judicial vacancies); MILLER CENTER OF PUB. AFFAIRS, IMPROVING
THE PROCESS FOR APPOINTING FEDERAL JUDGES (1996).
2. That particular attribute deserves somewhat less assessment. This
constituent of delay comprises an inherent difficulty which resists felicitous
solution, and other writers have comprehensively assessed the question. See
Bermant, Hennemuth & Mangum, supra note 1, at 319; Remedying the
Permanent Vacancy Problem in the Federal Judiciary, 42 RECORD ASS’N BAR CITY
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contemporary difficulty, is political and can be ascribed to
conflicting White House and Senate control which commenced
approximately forty years ago.
A. Persistent Vacancies
Legislators expanded federal jurisdiction in the 1960s, 3
enhancing civil causes of action plus criminalizing more activity,
phenomena which increased district litigation. 4 Congress attacked
rising caseloads with seats. 5 Over the fifteen years before 1995,
appointment times mounted. 6 In 1992, for example, court of
appeals nominations required twelve months, and confirmations
required three months. 7 The processes’ significant number of
phases and participants makes some delay intrinsic. 8 Presidents
N.Y. 374 (1987).
3. MILLER CENTER, supra note 1, at 3; see Carl Tobias, The New Certiorari
and a National Study of the Appeals Courts, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1264, 1268–70
(1996) (assessing the contemporary difficulty which results from contrasting
political control).
4. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub.
L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796 (1994); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 133 (2012) (providing for the appointment of appellate
court and district court judges); Archive of Judicial Vacancies, ADMIN. OFFICE OF
THE
U.S.
COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicialvacancies/archive-judicial-vacancies (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter
Archive of Judicial Vacancies] (cataloging federal judicial vacancies since 1981)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
6. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE
FEDERAL COURTS (1995), https://perma.cc/D5TP-MDEY (“Research aimed at
eliminating obstacles to efficiency in the federal courts shows two disturbing
trends: (1) an increasing percentage of vacant judgeships; and (2) a lengthening
average time from the occurrence of a vacancy to the confirmation of a successor
judge.”).
7. Bermant, Hennemuth & Mangum, supra note 1, at 331 (providing data
on average time from vacancy to nomination and nomination to confirmation).
Appellate nominations consumed twenty months and appointments six months
during 1997, the first year of President Bill Clinton’s last administration, and
2001, the first year of President George W. Bush’s initial administration. Each
resembled President Barack Obama’s first year and his last half term. Carl
Tobias, Curing the Federal Court Vacancy Crisis, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 883,
887 (2018).
8. See generally Bermant, Hennemuth & Mangum, supra note 1, 320–23
(providing the mechanisms for judicial appointments); Sheldon Goldman, Obama
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assiduously consult home state politicians, seeking advice on
candidates, and the officials recommend prominent submissions.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) develops probing
“background checks.” The American Bar Association (ABA)
evaluates and ranks choices. 9 The Department of Justice (DOJ)
helps scrutinize individuals while robustly preparing nominees for
Senate assessment. The Judiciary Committee analyzes picks,
schedules their hearings, discusses candidates and votes; choices
reported might attain floor debates, when necessary, preceding
chamber ballots.
B. The Contemporary Dilemma
Article II envisions that senators will moderate flawed
nominations, while politicization has infused the selection process
since the Republic’s founding. 10 However, partisanship continued,
significantly expanding when President Richard Nixon promised
to deliver “law and order” by forwarding “strict constructionists,” 11
and perceptibly increased with Judge Robert Bork’s mammoth
Supreme Court fight. 12 Politicization soared, while divided
government and the fervent hope that the party without executive
control may recapture it and confirm jurists fueled dilatory
behavior.
and the Federal Judiciary: Great Expectations But Will He Have a Dickens of a
Time Living up to Them?, 7 FORUM No. 1, 2009, at 9–12 (summarizing the judicial
selection process prior to the Obama Administration and proffering suggestions
for improvement).
9. MILLER CENTER, supra note 1; see ABA, STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL
JUDICIARY: WHAT IT IS AND HOW IT WORKS (1983).
10. THE FEDERALIST NO. 76, at 513 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob Cooke ed.,
1961); see MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 28 (2000); SHELDON GOLDMAN, PICKING
FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT THROUGH REAGAN
(1997).
11. GOLDMAN, supra note 10, at 205; DAVID M. O’BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE:
REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 20
(1988).
12. See e.g., MARK GITENSTEIN, MATTERS OF PRINCIPLE: AN INSIDER’S
ACCOUNT OF AMERICA’S REJECTION OF ROBERT BORK’S NOMINATION TO THE SUPREME
COURT 11–12 (1992); JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE
SUPREME COURT 18–19 (2007).
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Relatively slow nominations and confirmations might
explicate the dearth of approvals in the Bill Clinton and George W.
Bush presidencies that 1997 and 2001 selection exemplifies. 13 In
President Barack Obama’s tenure, Republican cooperation
plummeted, which the unprecedented refusal to assess Judge
Merrick Garland, Obama’s dynamic Supreme Court nominee,
revealed. 14
After the GOP earned a chamber majority in November 2014,
vowing to dutifully effectuate “regular order” again, the party
confirmed merely two Obama nominees for the appellate courts
and eighteen for the district courts, the fewest since Harry Truman
was president, which meant that there were 103 appeals court and
district court vacancies at Trump’s inauguration; New York
encountered two appellate court and a half dozen additional open
trial court slots. 15
III. Trump Administration Judicial Selection
A. Nomination Process
Across the 2016 presidential campaign, Donald Trump
pledged to nominate and seat individuals who are ideological
conservatives. He respected the promises by marshaling and
13. Tobias, supra note 7, at 888–89 (assessing additional judicial selection
issues in the Clinton and Bush presidencies).
14. Robin Bradley Kar & Jason Mazzone, The Garland Affair: What History
and the Constitution Really Say About President Obama’s Powers to Appoint a
Replacement for Justice Scalia, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 53, 55–61 (2016) (“[After
Justice Antonin Scalia’s death,] Republican Senators—led by Senate Majority
Leader Mitch McConnell—immediately announced that they would not vote on
any replacement nominations by President Barack Obama.”); Carl Tobias,
Confirming Supreme Court Justices in a Presidential Election Year, 94 WASH. U.
L. REV. 1089, 1093 (2017) (“Obama’s tapping of a sitting circuit judge, like nearly
all present Supreme Court members, facilitated Senate consideration, as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . background check and American Bar
Association . . . evaluation only needed to be updated.”).
15. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5; see also 163 CONG. REC.
S8021–24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements of Sens. Feinstein & Leahy)
(criticizing Republicans’ willingness to disregard judicial selection norms in
confirming appellate court judges); Carl Tobias, The Republican Senate and
Regular Order, 101 IOWA L. REV. ONLINE 12, 15–34 (2016) (defining the concept of
regular order and arguing that the Republican Senate has not restored regular
order since winning the majority in 2014).
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confirming Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh with many
analogous circuit, and comparatively few similar district,
nominees. 16 Trump established appellate court appointments
records over his initial year of twelve confirmations plus more the
second. 17
The chief executive adopts certain valuable conventions but
his White House omits and downplays numerous efficacious
customs. For instance, Trump, as every contemporary president,
assigns lead responsibility for judicial selection to the White House
Counsel, related duties to the Justice Department, and central
responsibility for district court vacancies to in-state politicians,
while stressing appeals court openings. 18 When tendering
appellate prospects, the White House Counsel accentuates
conservatism and youth and he employs the “short list” of possible
High Court aspirants that the Federalist Society principally
compiled. 19 Those ideas govern today, as the Society’s Executive
Vice President, Leonard Leo, advises the chief executive on judicial
selection. 20 Trump emphasizes the appeals courts, because they
16. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5 (recounting Trump’s judicial
appointments).
17. Id. (documenting eighteen additional appellate court judicial
confirmations during 2019).
18. Carl Tobias, Senate Gridlock and Federal Judicial Selection, 88 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 2233, 2239–40 (2013) (describing President Obama’s approach to
federal judicial appointments); Michael S. Schmidt & Maggie Haberman,
McGahn, Soldier for Trump and Witness Against Him, Leaves White House, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), https://perma.cc/R62E-EYCN (last visited Nov. 4, 2019)
(recounting Trump’s tweet which announced the discharge of McGahn, who
served as the initial White House Counsel, and the appointment of Patrick
Cipollone, who serves as the second White House Counsel) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
19. Donald F. McGahn II, A Brief History of Judicial Appointments From the
Last 50 Years Through the Trump Administration, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. ONLINE
105, 124–34 (2019) (summarizing McGahn’s experience and success as White
House Counsel); Jeffrey Toobin, The Conservative Pipeline to the Supreme Court,
NEW YORKER (Apr. 10, 2017), https://perma.cc/8C3P-2XPS (last visited Nov. 4,
2019) (profiling the Federalist Society and it’s executive vice president, Leonard
Leo); Charlie Savage, Trump is Rapidly Reshaping the Judiciary. Here’s How.,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2017), https://perma.cc/72YH-ASNB (last visited Nov. 4,
2019) (recounting McGahn’s plan to fill the appellate courts with young,
extremely conservative judges).
20. Robert O’Harrow, Jr. & Shawn Boburg, A Conservative Activist’s
Behind-the-Scenes Campaign to Remake the Nation’s Courts, WASH. POST (May
21, 2019), https://perma.cc/F57D-7FP6 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (documenting
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are courts of last resort for nearly all filings, create greater policy
than district courts, and issue rulings that cover a few states. 21 The
president’s appellate confirmees are very conservative, young and
talented.
However, this administration violates or dilutes longstanding
traditions. One is meticulously consulting politicians about home
state vacancies, a custom which recent presidents have diligently
applied. That custom was a chief reason for blue slips, which only
permitted hearings when each home state politician duly returned
slips across Obama’s entire presidency. Democratic senators
contended that the first White House Counsel actually consulted
nominally about their jurisdictions’ appeals court openings, and
McGahn retorted that consultation does not appear in the
Constitution. 22 Most pertinently, New York’s senators accused
Trump of choosing Joseph Bianco, Michael Park and Steven
Menashin, three New York Second Circuit nominees, without
adequate consultation. 23
Leonard Leo’s involvement in the selection process and the subsequent media
campaign as well as his continuing involvement in the appointments process) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Zoe Tillman, After Eight Years on
the Sidelines, This Conservative Group Is Primed to Reshape the Courts Under
Trump, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/M5LM-LH7B (last
visited Nov. 4, 2019) (“Leo said that the White House does consult him on
nominees, but he disputed that he was ‘calling the shots.’”).
21. GOLDMAN, supra note 10; Tobias, supra note 18, at 2240–41; 163 CONG.
REC. S8022–24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“In a way,
circuit courts serve as the de facto Supreme Court to the vast majority of
individuals who bring cases. They are the last word.”).
22. Thomas Kaplan, Trump Is Putting Indelible Conservative Stamp on
Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES (July 31, 2018), https://perma.cc/7AFW-5VSR (last visited
Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Zoe Tillman,
Here’s How Trump is Trying to Remake His Least Favorite Court, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Mar. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/KQ3E-WA4U (last updated Mar. 16, 2018) (last
visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
23. Press Release, Gillibrand Statement On President Trump And Senate
Republicans Forcing The Nominations Of Two Far-Right New York Circuit Court
Judges Over Strong Objections From Both Home-State Senators (Feb. 13, 2019),
https://perma.cc/5MYK-WZQ4 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Press Release, Schumer Statement on Senate
Republicans Advancing the Nominations of Michael Park and Joseph Bianco for
the Second Circuit (Mar. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/BT82-K9PT (last visited Nov.
4, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Press
Release, Schumer, Gillibrand Denounce Menashi Nomination To New York 2nd
Circuit,
Cite
Long,
Disturbing
Record
(Sept.
11,
2019),
https://www.democrats.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/schumer-gillibrand-
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A related departure from multiple lengthy precedents was
Trump’s resolution to exclude the American Bar Association from
the selection process. All presidents in office after Dwight
Eisenhower, save Presidents Trump and George W. Bush,
carefully invoked American Bar Association examinations and
ratings when nominating candidates, and President Obama
refrained from tapping selections whom the expert, professional
organization deemed not qualified. 24 However, Trump has
mustered nine appellate court and district court nominees whom
the ABA ranked not qualified—five of whom have secured
confirmation—although the ABA directly rated many of the New
York designees well qualified, which is the organization’s highest
ranking. 25
denounce-menashi-nomination-to-new-york-2nd-circuit-cite-long-disturbingrecord- (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review) (New York senators expressing similar opposition to New York Second
Circuit nominee Steven Menashi); Corinne Ramey, White House Lawyer
Confirmed to Federal Judgeship Over Democratic Objections, WALL STREET J.
(Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/white-house-lawyer-confirmed-tofederal-judgeship-over-democratic-objections-11573769287
(Sen.
Schumer
characterizing Menashi as “one of the most contemptible nominees to come before
the Senate in all my time in this body” and contending Menashi “would be a
disgrace [to] the seat once held by the great Thurgood Marshall”); Tobias, supra
note 7, at 898 (concerning similar White House failures to seek adequate
consultation with additional senators, the overwhelming majority of whom have
been Democrats, for home state vacancies).
24. Adam Liptak, White House Ends Bar Association’s Role in Vetting Judges,
N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 31, 2017), https://perma.cc/39NZ-RM5T (last visited Nov. 4, 2019)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 163 CONG. REC. S8022–24
(daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statements of Sens. Feinstein & Leahy) (strongly touting
the substantial value of American Bar Association evaluations and ratings and
stating that Obama refrained from suggesting nominees who received not
qualified ABA ratings). But see infra note 53 and accompanying text (Sen.
Grassley strenuously arguing that the ABA is an external “political group” that
should not dictate Judiciary Committee scheduling); Nominations, S. COMM.
JUDICIARY
(Oct.
30,
2019),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/10/30/2019/nominations (last visited
Nov. 8, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (Sen. Mike Lee
(R-UT) strenuously criticizing the ABA as a liberal political organization and
recommending that the White House and the Justice Department terminate
cooperation with the ABA in the selection process).
25. ABA STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY, RATINGS OF ARTICLE III
AND
ARTICLE
IV
JUDICIAL
NOMINEES
116TH
CONGRESS
(2019),
https://perma.cc/Y7LZ-T6N3; ABA STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY,
RATINGS OF ARTICLE III AND ARTICLE IV JUDICIAL NOMINEES 115TH CONGRESS
(2018), https://perma.cc/BY3Z-DX5D; Tobias, supra note 7, at 893.
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Trump employs comparatively traditional procedures when
sending district court choices. For instance, his White House like
recent predecessors, depends on home state politician suggestions
while premising most nominations on the nominees’ strong ability
to promptly resolve massive caseloads. 26 Numerous submissions
are preeminent candidates who enjoy quite high ABA rankings. 27
Yet some nominees withdrew, the ABA rated three more not
qualified, and Trump cautioned Republican Senate members to
vote against nominees whom they determine lack the requisite
qualifications. 28
The president ignores or deemphasizes numerous effective
judicial selection mechanisms. One problem with trial court
selection is failing to prioritize the eighty-seven vacancies—fifty of
which are judicial emergencies—in the haste to rapidly confirm
ample exceptionally conservative, young and competent appeals
court jurists. 29 Trump proposes fewer judges in states which
26. See Carl Tobias, Recalibrating Judicial Renominations in the Trump
Administration, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 9, 12–19 (2017) (recounting
Obama’s district court selection process and the president’s nominees, especially
his administration’s reliance on nominees’ ability to manage substantial dockets);
but see Seung Min Kim, Trump’s Judge Picks: ‘Not Qualified,’ Prolific Bloggers,
POLITICO (Oct. 17, 2017), https://perma.cc/4UFE-8JUJ (last updated Oct. 18,
2017) (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (reporting on controversial Trump nominees and
weak qualifications of a number to resolve large caseloads) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
27. Texas Federal District Court Judges Walter Counts and Karen Gren
Scholer are preeminent examples. See ABA STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL
JUDICIARY, RATINGS OF ARTICLE III AND ARTICLE IV JUDICIAL NOMINEES 116TH
CONGRESS; ABA STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY, RATINGS OF ARTICLE III
AND ARTICLE IV JUDICIAL NOMINEES 115TH CONGRESS.
28. Tobias, supra note 7, at 894; Tom McCarthy, Judge Not: Five Judicial
Nominees Trump Withdrew—and Four Pending, GUARDIAN (Mar. 10, 2019),
https://perma.cc/ZFG7-GLUF (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
29. Judicial emergencies soared from twelve to as many as eighty-six.
Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5. The one remaining appellate court
opening is a judicial emergency. Judicial Emergencies, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/judicialemergencies (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Judicial Emergencies] (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Sixty percent of district court
openings and fewer than one percent of appellate court vacancies are judicial
emergencies. Id.; Current Judicial Vacancies, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/current-judicialvacancies (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Current Judicial Vacancies] (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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Democrats represent, although these jurisdictions face plentiful
emergencies, such as California’s mammoth thirteen and New
York’s massive eight. 30 The latter had openings in up to fifteen
appellate court and district court positions (ten emergencies);
however, the White House neglected to recommend even one
district choice before April of last year, and since then, had failed
to tender any suggestions regarding numerous other district court
vacancies before November of this year, while the administration
did not confirm a single jurist for the New York district court
openings until October 2019. 31 In April 2018, Trump proposed
Judge Richard Sullivan for the Second Circuit, in October of that
year named Judge Sullivan’s colleague, Joseph Bianco, and
Michael Park and in September 2019 recommended Steven
Menshi as Second Circuit nominees. 32 The chamber subsequently

30. Judicial Emergencies, supra note 29; but see President Donald J. Trump
Announces Ninth Wave of Judicial Nominees and Tenth Wave of United States
Attorney Nominees, WHITE HOUSE (Dec. 20, 2017), https://perma.cc/F5S4-PV9U
(last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
(nominating greater numbers of appellate court and district court nominees from
“blue” states); infra notes 88, 96.
31. Data verify the priority that the Republican Senate majority accords
“red” states. Trump confirmed ninety-one appellate court and district court judges
and nominated 108 prospects in two-GOP senator states, and confirmed thirtythree judges and nominated fifty-three candidates in two-Democratic senator
states. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5 (spanning 2017 through 2019);
Confirmation
Listing,
ADMIN.
OFFICE
OF
THE
U.S.
COURTS,
https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-vacancies/confirmationlisting (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Confirmation Listing] (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
32. President Donald J. Trump Announces Thirteenth Wave of Judicial
Nominees and Seventh Wave of United States Marshal Nominees, WHITE HOUSE
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/WTN2-HZYK (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); President Donald J. Trump
Announces Eighteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees, Eighteenth Wave of United
States Attorney Nominees, and Thirteenth Wave of United States Marshal
Nominees, WHITE HOUSE (Oct. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/Z93Y-TLCV (last
visited Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Oct. 2018 Announcement] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); President Donald J. Trump Announces
Judicial Nominees, United States Attorney Nominees, and United States Marshal
Nominees,
WHITE
HOUSE
(Aug.
14,
2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trumpannounces-judicial-nominees-united-states-attorney-nominees-united-statesmarshal-nominees/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Aug. 2019
Announcement] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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confirmed Sullivan, Bianco, Park and Menashi. 33 In May 2018, the
president in turn adeptly nominated Gary Brown, Diane Gujarati,
Eric Komitee and Rachel Kovner in the Eastern District; Lewis
Liman and Mary Kay Vyskocil to the Southern District; and John
Sinatra for the Western District; 34 while that November, the White
House nominated Thomas Marcelle to the Northern District and
one year later named John Cronan and Iris Lan to the Southern
District. 35
Trump has eschewed or downplayed the constructive route of
improving minority judicial representation. 36 For example, the
33. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5, Confirmation Listing, supra
note 31.
34. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5; President Donald J. Trump
Announces Fourteenth Wave of Judicial Nominees, Thirteenth Wave of United
States Attorney Nominees, and Eighth Wave of United States Marshal Nominees,
WHITE HOUSE (May 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/JW66-YJLU (last visited Nov. 4,
2019) [hereinafter May 2018 Announcement] (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
35. Oct. 2018 Announcement, supra note 32; Twelve Nominations Sent to the
Senate, WHITE HOUSE (May 21, 2019), https://perma.cc/UP5W-Z5UG (last visited
Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter May 2019 Announcement] (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review); President Donald J. Trump Announces Judicial
Nominations, WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/ARH2-MAYB (last
visited Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Apr. 2019 Announcement] (renominating
nominees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); President Donald
J. Trump Announces Intent to Nominate Judicial Nominees, WHITE HOUSE (Jan.
22, 2019), https://perma.cc/5D5V-JRPK (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter Jan.
2019 Announcement] (renominating Marcelle and nominating Philip Halpern to the
Southern District) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); President
Donald J. Trump Announces Intent to Nominate Judicial Nominees, WHITE HOUSE
(Jan. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/94FE-J24U (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (nominating
California nominees) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Eight
Nominations and Three Withdrawals Sent to the Senate, WHITE HOUSE (Sept. 19,
2019), https://perma.cc/EU2B-7QFH (concerning the withdrawal of Northern
District of New York nominee Thomas Marcelle purportedly because Sen.
Gillibrand did not return her blue slip); Robert Gavin & Mike Goodwin,
Gillibrand Blocked Judge’s Nomination to the Federal Bench, ALBANY TIMES
UNION (Aug. 29, 2019), https://www.timesunion.com/news/article/U-S-Attorneyin-Albany-picked-for-federal14397720.php?utm_campaign=CMS%20Sharing%20Tools%20(Desktop)
&utm_source=share-by-email&utm_medium=email; President Donald J. Trump
Announces
Judicial
Nominees,
WHITE
HOUSE
(Nov.
6,
2019),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/president-donald-j-trumpannounces-judicial-nominees-8/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Nov. 2019
Announcement] (on file with Washington and Lee Law Review.
36. Carl Tobias, President Donald Trump’s War on Federal Judicial
Diversity, 54 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531, 547–563 (2019); Hailey Fuchs, Democrats
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White House instituted negligible activity to pursue, cultivate,
evaluate and confirm accomplished, conservative ethnic minorities
or lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ)
candidates by, for instance, employing diverse appointments staff
or requesting that home state politicians search for, identify,
examine and submit numerous well qualified minority
candidates. 37 Of Trump’s 162 confirmees, merely one is a lesbian
and only twenty are persons of color. 38 Of 227 marshaled nominees,
merely one is gay and only thirty-three are ethnic minorities—
consisting of sixteen Asian Americans, eight Latino/as, nine
African Americans (although no one in the last ethnic group was
nominated for a court of appeals position), and one Jamaican. 39 Of
the New York appellate court and district court aspirants, Trump
nominated four women, but merely Park, Gujarati and Lan are
lawyers of color. 40
B. Confirmation Process
The appointments system resembles the nomination process’
detrimental elements in several ways, primarily by abolishing or
changing rules and conventions that have long operated quite
efficaciously. Illustrative are selective modifications of (1) the
hundred-year-old policy for blue slips—which permit committee
Question Absence of Black or Hispanic Nominees Among Trump’s 41 Circuit Court
Judges, WASH. POST (July 8, 2019), https://perma.cc/95QC-DJ5U (last visited Nov.
4, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
37. LGBTQ means openly disclosed sexual preference, which some judicial
candidates, nominees and confirmees may have not divulged. LGBTQ individuals
are considered “minorities” throughout this piece. See sources cited infra note 52
(contending that Trump’s nomination pattern evidences hostility to the LGBTQ
community).
38. Northern District of Illinois Judge Mary Rowland is the sole lesbian
appointee. Tobias, supra note 36, at 555, 556 n.124; Archive of Judicial Vacancies,
supra note 5, Confirmation Listing, supra note 31.
39. Ninth Circuit nominee Patrick Bumatay is the sole gay nominee. See
sources cited supra note 38; Sept. 2019 Announcement, supra note 32 (scrutinizing
the composition of Trump’s nominees).
40. Apr. 2019 Announcement, supra note 35 (renominating Eastern District
of New York nominee Diane Gujarati as well as Northern District of Illinois
nominees Martha Pacold and Mary Rowland in April); Jan. 2019 Announcement,
supra note 35 (renominating Park); Nov. 2019 Announcement, supra note 35
(nominating Lan).
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hearings only when both senators provide slips—and (2) panel
hearings.
During fall 2017, Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), as
then-Judiciary Committee Chair, announced the institution of a
new “circuit exception” for prospects who lack blue slips provided
by the two senators who represent home states of the prospects,
especially due to “political or ideological” opposition. 41 He amended
the slip concept, which both the Republican and Democratic parties
had strictly followed throughout all eight years in Obama’s
presidency—the most recent, salient precedent. 42 With the
committee processing numerous choices, this situation declined
when Grassley nominally supported granting himself as Chair
substantial responsibility for determining whether Trump had
“adequately consulted,” although the White House only minimally
consulted with practically all Democratic home state senators. 43
Particularly relevant for New York was each senator’s marked
opposition to Bianco and Park, which Senator Lindsey Graham
(R-SC), the next Chair, characterized as an “ideological dispute,”
even though full consultation had promoted Sullivan’s prompt
installation. 44
41. 163 CONG. REC. S7,174 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 2017) (statement of Sen.
Grassley); id. at S7,285 (daily ed. Nov. 16, 2017); Prepared Statement by Senator
Chuck Grassley of Iowa, S.
JUDICIARY COMM. (Nov. 29, 2017),
https://perma.cc/QG7F-A429 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Carl Hulse, Judge’s Death Gives Trump a
Chance to Remake a Vexing Court, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2018),
https://perma.cc/4S2R-Y5XQ (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
42. As Chair, Grassley strictly adhered to this blue slip policy across
Obama’s final two years, and Patrick Leahy (D-VT) followed the policy during
Obama’s initial six years. Executive Business Meeting, S. COMM. JUDICIARY (Feb.
15, 2018), https://perma.cc/6YAU-JHF8 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (statements of
Sens. Grassley & Leahy) [hereinafter Feb. 15 Meeting] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Carl Tobias, Senate Blue Slips and
Senate Regular Order, 37 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 1, 8–9 (Nov. 20, 2018)
(recounting the history of the blue slip policy during Grassley’s and Leahy’s time
as Chair).
43. Feb. 15 Meeting, supra note 42 (statements of Sens. Feinstein & Leahy);
see sources cited supra note 22–24 (honoring a very small number of blue slips);
Tobias, supra note 42, at 23–26 (arguing that little precedent supports a circuit
exception).
44. For the processes, see Executive Business Meeting, S. JUDICIARY COMM.
(Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/11/07/2019/executivebusiness-meeting (last visited Nov. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Nov. 7 Meeting] (on file
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Grassley explicitly acknowledged that blue slips were meant
to insure that presidents thoroughly consult home state
lawmakers while protecting the legislators’ judicial selection
prerogatives and the interests of the electorate whom senators
represent, but Grassley and Graham have respected slips for
district court picks. 45 However, Republican senators had
persistently deployed slips to exclude talented, centrist Obama
appellate court nominees, for political or ideological reasons, the
same premises which Grassley had expressly declared
illegitimate. 46
Republicans, as the Senate majority party, share
responsibility for the problems detailed by changing effective
hearing rules and customs. During the Trump Administration, the
GOP has prescribed fifteen hearings which featured multiple
nominees comprising two appeals court, and four trial level,
nominees without the minority’s permission; this notion
contrasted to three similar hearings throughout Obama’s eight
with Washington and Lee Law Review); Executive Business Meeting, S. COMM.
JUDICIARY (Mar. 7, 2019), https://perma.cc/8FM8-F9J5 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019)
[hereinafter Mar. 7 Meeting] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Nominations,
S.
COMM.
JUDICIARY
(Sept.
11,
2019),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/09/11/2019/nominations (last visited
Nov. 8, 2019) [hereinafter Menashi Hearing] (Graham conducting Menashi
hearing despite New York senators’ opposition); Nominations, S. COMM.
JUDICIARY (Feb. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/T8NY-TVMH (last visited Nov. 4,
2019) [hereinafter Bianco and Park Hearing] (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review); Executive Business Meeting, S. COMM. JUDICIARY (Sept. 13,
2018), https://perma.cc/2534-687M (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Nominations, S. COMM. JUDICIARY (Aug. 1,
2018), https://perma.cc/EQ8T-ZNY8 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter
Sullivan Hearing] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); 164 CONG.
REC. S6,799–800 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 2018) (confirming Sullivan); 165 CONG. REC.
S2,710 (daily ed. May 8, 2019) (confirming Bianco); id. at 2,762 (daily ed. May 9,
2019) (confirming Park); id. at 6,596 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2019) (confirming
Menashi); sources cited supra note 32 (nominating Sullivan, Bianco, Park &
Menashi).
45. See sources cited supra note 42. Senator Graham, who became Chair in
January, vowed to follow Grassley’s policy, and did so with Judges Bianco, Park
and Menashi as well as numerous other appellate court nominees, especially for
appellate court vacancies in jurisdictions represented by Democratic senators.
Executive Business Meeting, S.
COMM. JUDICIARY (Feb. 7, 2019),
https://perma.cc/8XVC-XGFL (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); sources cited supra note 44.
46. Numerous senators even offered no reasons. See sources cited supra
notes 15, 42 (concerning senators’ use of blue slips).
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years, which happened only in peculiar situations and when
Republicans consented. 47 Most pertinent to New York, Bianco and
Park received a single hearing together with three district court
candidates and Sullivan’s hearing included six additional district
court candidates, although neither hearing enjoyed minority party
assent. 48 The hearings were so packed that senators had negligible
time to undertake probing queries. 49 Sessions, especially with
these prospects, seemed rushed and lacking appropriate care for
people who may earn life tenure. 50 Some circuit and district court
nominees delayed by repeating questions, deflected queries or
failed to remark on whether, after confirmation, they would
dutifully recuse when matters treated issues on which the
nominees had labored or about which many held extreme
perspectives. 51 A third of Trump nominees have compiled
distinctly anti-LGBTQ records. 52
47. See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Filling the Fourth Circuit Vacancies, 89 N.C. L.
REV. 2161, 2174–76 (2011) (Ranking Member “Senator Sessions agreed to the
unusual practice of furnishing the two [Fourth Circuit] nominees a single panel
hearing, which Senators Burr and Hagan attended to express their support for
the nominees.”); 163 CONG. REC. S8,021–24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement of
Sen. Leahy) (“Multiple circuit court nominees are regularly stacked on single
panels.”).
48. Bianco and Park Hearing, supra note 44; Sullivan Hearing, supra note
44; Menashi Hearing, supra note 44 (Menashi and three district court nominees);
Tobias, supra note 7, at 901 (describing similarly packed hearings).
49. Bianco and Park Hearing, supra note 44; Sullivan Hearing, supra note
43; Executive Business Meeting, S.
COMM. JUDICIARY (Apr. 4, 2019),
https://perma.cc/EKN6-CRST (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (suggesting lack of
resources for the minority party to prepare for packed hearings) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
50. Most senators had merely five minutes to pose queries. See sources cited
supra notes 22, 49; 163 CONG. REC. S8021–24 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 2017) (statement
of Sens. Feinstein & Leahy) (regarding lack of care in the Republican-led
hearings).
51. Judges Park and Menashi exhibited these characteristics. Bianco and
Park Hearing, supra note 44; Menashi Hearing, supra note 44; Nov. 7 Meeting,
supra note 44; see also 28 U.S.C. § 455 (2012) (requiring that a federal judge
recuse when the jurist has a “personal bias or prejudice” concerning a party,
served as a lawyer on the matter, or participated in the proceedings as a
governmental employee). The considerations reviewed above can appear to make
these hearings meaningless exercises in which participants exchange few
substantive ideas.
52. Stacking the Courts: The Fight Against Trump’s Extremist Nominees,
LAMBDA LEGAL, https://perma.cc/5WHV-JQGV (last updated Jan. 31, 2019)
(listing reasons for opposing the confirmation of extreme nominees one third of
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One important departure from regular order was Grassley’s
mistaken choice to not wait on American Bar Association
evaluations and ratings before committee hearings, and even votes,
despite incessant requests from Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), the
Ranking Member, to have this information after completion. He
strenuously argued that the external “political group” should never
dictate panel scheduling. 53 Most notorious was the hearing for
Judge Sullivan and the many New York trial level picks. 54 It, thus,
was foreseeable that controversial submissions received party-line
ballots. 55
Once nominees win approval, similar dynamics circumscribe
efficacious review: Democrats promote cloture votes and secure roll
call ballots on practically all nominees; GOP and Democratic
members consistently vote in lockstep with their respective
parties; and Democrats’ explosion of the powerful 2013 “nuclear
option” means that nominees can be appointed on majority
ballots. 56 Perhaps most critical, Republicans rammed four
whom had compiled anti-LGBTQ records) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review); see Eleanor Clift, What Trump’s Judicial Nominees Have in
Common: They Really Don’t Want LGBTQ People to Have Rights, DAILY BEAST
(Mar. 12, 2018), https://perma.cc/XR67-UHXR (last updated Mar. 12, 2018) (last
visited Nov. 4, 2019) (“One in three has something explicit in their record and/or
their writings that is hostile to LGBTQ rights.”) (on file with Washington and Lee
Law Review).
53. Sullivan Hearing, supra note 43 (statements of Sens. Grassley &
Feinstein).
54. On the hearing date, the ABA contributed evaluations and ratings on
four district nominees but only delivered input on the other two nominees
subsequently.
Id.; see Tobias, supra note 15, at 36 (suggesting “the President
might correspondingly facilitate American Bar Association candidate
assessments . . . while urging speedy chamber analysis” as a part of regular
order).
55. See, e.g., Executive Business Meeting, S. COMM. JUDICIARY (Dec. 7, 2017),
https://perma.cc/ZT5R-RQVP (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (approving Eighth Circuit
nominee Leonard Steven Grasz) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Executive Business Meeting, S. COMM. JUDICIARY (Feb. 15, 2018),
https://perma.cc/EE3C-6EAU (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (approving Seventh
Circuit nominee Michael Brennan) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
56. 159 CONG. REC. S8,418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013) (limiting deployment of
the filibuster regarding appellate court and district court nominees by requiring
a majority rather than sixty votes for cloture). Cloture ballots and roll call votes
can torpedo weak nominations; majority confirmation votes may confirm strong
nominations. It is important to remember that the Republican Senate majority
detonated the nuclear option to eliminate filibusters of Supreme Court nominees
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appellate judges’ debates with chamber votes into one 2017 week
and pressed six court of appeals jurists over a 2018 week; they
followed cryptic notice. 57 The many nominees and their mammoth
records left Democrats comparatively few resources to prepare. 58
Some floor debates’ uninformative quality resembles that in panel
discussions. 59
The Republican Senate majority prioritizes appellate court
over district court approvals, curing non-emergency and red state
vacant court posts, and seating conservative white males. 60 This
and to slash the number of post-cloture debate hours for district court nominees
from thirty to two. See Tobias, supra note 14, at 1096, 1107; sources cited infra
note 59. Actions involving judicial selection instituted by the president, the
senators, and the Democratic and Republican political parties reflect which party
controls the presidency and the Senate.
57. Schedule for Pro Formas and Monday, May 7, 2018, SENATE DEMOCRATS
(Apr. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/KAL5-B63R (“Each nomination is subject to a
cloture vote and then, if cloture is invoked, up to 30 hours of post-cloture debate
prior to a vote on confirmation.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Schedule for Thursday, Apr. 26, 2018, SENATE DEMOCRATS (Apr. 25,
2018), https://perma.cc/Q4LW-2MS8 (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Schedule for Tuesday, Oct. 31, 2017, SENATE DEMOCRATS (Oct. 30, 2017),
https://perma.cc/82RK-2FLX (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
Schedule for Thursday, Oct. 26, 2017, SENATE DEMOCRATS (Oct. 25, 2017),
https://perma.cc/M892-P7BV (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
58. Executive Business Meeting, S. COMM. JUDICIARY (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://perma.cc/FJJ3-7VD6 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (statement of Sen.
Feinstein) (advocating for testimony, evaluations and ratings from the American
Bar Association as a critical aspect of the committee hearing process before
hearings proceed) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). President
Bush never attempted to confirm this many appellate court nominees in one
week; President Obama only confirmed that many nominees in a week once and
in special circumstances when the nominations had been pending for a protracted
period and the Senate was adjourning for the congressional session. Tobias, supra
note 7, at 902.
59. See sources supra notes 47–51 (discussing conduct during several
appellate court nomination hearings); 165 CONG. REC. S2,220 (daily ed. Apr. 3,
2019) (reducing post-cloture debate hours for district court nominees from thirty
to two); Burgess Everett & Marianne Levine, McConnell Preps New Nuclear
Option to Speed Trump Judges, POLITICO (Mar. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/MX47W27R (last updated Mar. 6, 2019) (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (describing
preparation of the nuclear option for district court nominees and stating that
“President Donald Trump’s stream of judges is about to become a torrent.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
60. The confirmation process priorities cataloged mirror the nominating
regime. See sources cited supra notes 16–25, 29–40 (surveying Trump’s
procedures for recommending nominees). Three of four New York Second Circuit
nominees who captured appointment are white males. Six of nine Trump New
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inattention to district court nominations and emergency openings
was undeserved for several reasons: trial jurists comprise the
federal judiciary’s plowhorses and resolve substantial litigation;
the emergency classification only applies in exceptional
circumstances; senators’ party affiliation should not drive court
judicial resource dissemination; and minority jurists present
numerous benefits. 61 These factors were magnified by the need to
fill a Supreme Court vacancy and 103 appellate court and district
court openings at Trump’s inauguration; Mitch McConnell (R-KY),
the chamber leader, orchestrated each by delaying confirmations
in the Obama Administration. 62
These priorities helped Trump achieve the court of appeals
record across his first half term and continue attaining success
throughout 2019. Yet, the Senate left twenty-three district court
nominees without confirmation, significant vacancies at 2017’s
close with more upon the next year’s conclusion, emergencies to
immensely proliferate, and few “blue” state and minority
confirmees. 63 New York appellate court and district court openings
soared from eight to fifteen and emergencies in fact multiplied
from a pair to eight. 64 However, Trump appointed only a single
New York candidate across his initial twenty-seven months, and
York district court nominees who currently await confirmation are white males,
but the lone district appointee is a white woman.
61. See supra notes 26, 29–31 (discussing judicial emergencies, district court
vacancies, and Trump’s “red” state priority); infra notes 70–75 and accompanying
text (summarizing the importance of district court judges and the advantages
proffered by nominating and confirming diverse candidates).
62. Michael A. Cohen, Mitch McConnell, Republican Nihilist, N.Y. REV.
BOOKS (Feb. 25, 2019), https://perma.cc/C3ZS-K9T3 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Charles Homans, Mitch
McConnell Got Everything He Wanted. But at What Cost?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 22,
2019), https://perma.cc/NL4Q-YUJ8 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); see generally MITCH MCCONNELL, THE LONG
GAME (2016).
63. For 2017 statistics and individual nominees, see U.S. SENATE, EXECUTIVE
CALENDAR ISS. NO. 188 (2017); Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5. For
2018 statistics and individual nominees, see 165 CONG. REC. S33 (daily ed. Jan. 2,
2019); Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5. For 2019 statistics and
individual nominees, see Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5.
64. See Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5 (indexing judicial
openings and emergencies during Trump Administration); sources cited supra
notes 32–35 (collecting Trump’s appellate court and district court nominations in
New York).
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all district choices with panel approval lacked confirmation at
2018’s close, yet were only renamed during this April. 65 The sole
nominees of color whom Trump marshaled were Park, Gujarati
and Lan.
In the final analysis, the New York state appellate court and
district court nominee packages’ makeup suggests the reasons for
Trump’s dilatory renaming of district nominees with committee
reports and explains why three unoccupied positions can still be
missing nominees as late as mid-November. The White House may
have proffered four appeals court nominees, while the senators
apparently proposed many trial level candidates. 66 In short,
Trump promptly extracted appointment of four appellate court
jurists from “trading” and seemed to delay or renege on the district
choices. 67
IV. Consequences
The nomination and confirmation processes’ assessments
reveal that essential ideas which Trump and the Senate employ
manifest plenty of detrimental ramifications. Valuable yardsticks
include the striking one appellate court, and eighty-seven trial
court, vacant posts—fifty-one of which involve emergencies—with
substantial percentages in the latter two categories emanating
65. See sources cited supra notes 32–35, 63 (collecting Trump’s New York
appellate court and district court nominations and the nominees remaining at the
end of 2018).
66. The New York senators retained blue slips for three New York Second
Circuit nominees and returned them for one New York Second Circuit nominee
who smoothly captured appointment. See supra note 44 (collecting the hearings,
executive business meetings and confirmation debates and votes that resulted in
confirmations for Sullivan, Bianco, Park and Menashi); infra notes 111–113 and
accompanying text (suggesting that trades may impose certain detrimental
effects).
67. For assessment of “trades” and bipartisan courts, see infra Section IV;
Zoe Tillman, The White House Has Pitched a Nominee for Manhattan’s Powerful
US Attorney Opening, BUZZFEED NEWS (Aug. 7, 2017), https://perma.cc/JEH7JY2G (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review). Trump also seemed to taunt the California, Illinois and New York
senators, who occupy positions in the Senate Democratic leadership, by slowly
renaming nominees on whom all had agreed. Carl Tobias, Filling the California
Ninth Circuit Vacancies, 92 S. CAL. L. REV. POSTSCRIPT 83 (2019); sources cited
supra notes 31–35, 40.
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from states that Democrats represent, and minuscule confirmees
and nominees who constitute minority individuals, propositions
which New York’s circumstances epitomize. 68 Indeed, before
August 2019, the statistics had been worse than at Trump’s
inauguration. 69 These elements pressure monumental numbers of
litigants and their counsel as well as district courts and judges,
who must swiftly, inexpensively and fairly resolve numerous
cases. 70 Trial judges finally decide a significant percentage of civil
matters, and criminal litigation receives precedence under the
Speedy Trial Act. 71
Certain parameters—eighty-seven district court vacancies,
twelve in New York, rampant emergencies and comparatively few
minority nominees and confirmees, many of whom make
substantial contributions—show the necessity to appoint
considerably more jurists who are diverse. Federal courts are a
significant locus where people of color and LGBTQ individuals
could be excessively represented as defendants in the criminal
68. See supra notes 29–40 and accompanying text.
69. In February 2017, there were 108 circuit and district court openings with
forty-three considered emergencies. Archive of Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5.
By August 2019, there were 110 circuit and district vacancies with sixty-two
designated as emergencies. Id. Data worsened even as status changes slowed.
Tobias, supra note 7, at 906–07. Thirteen district nominees won confirmation at
the August 2019 recess. Hailey Fuchs, As Democrats Debated Without Mentioning
Federal Judges, the Senate Confirmed 13 More Trump Nominees, WASH. POST
(Aug. 1, 2019), https://perma.cc/QS7J-L4FS (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“[These rules] should be construed, administered, and
employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.”); Patrick Johnston, Problems in
Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule: The Example of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1325, 1395 (1995) (“Apart from its capacity to
empower and guide particular procedural decisions, the trinity [of the “just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination’], by its terms, applies to the construction
and administration of all of the Rules.”). District judges are the lone jurists whom
most parties face; protracted vacancies deprive judges and litigants of resources
which they desperately need.
71. Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161–74 (2012); see Joe Palazzolo,
In Federal Courts, the Civil Cases Pile Up, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 6, 2015),
https://perma.cc/BJQ4-SBR2 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As
Criminal Laws Proliferate, More Are Ensnared, WALL STREET J. (July 23, 2011),
https://perma.cc/MR4X-6R5N (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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justice system and lack enough judicial representation. New York
has long been very diverse, which compels improved minority
representation. Limited attention to diversity has been a lost
opportunity for enhancing the quality of justice that parties need.
More representation supplies benefits. Numerous persons of color,
women and LGBTQ jurists can furnish different, instructive
perspectives, 72 which encompass issues regarding abortion,
constitutional and employment discrimination law and other
complex questions which federal courts assess. 73 Diverse judges
curtail ethnic, gender and sexual orientation biases that undercut
justice. 74 Tribunals which mirror the nation increase citizens’
respect for the judiciary by demonstrating that ample people of
color, women and LGBTQ candidates serve efficaciously as court
members. 75
72. Theresa Beiner, The Elusive (but Worthwhile) Quest for a Diverse Bench
in the New Millennium, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 597, 610–17 (2003) (providing
anecdotal and empirical evidence of the effect of differing perspective from diverse
jurists); John McCain & Jeff Flake, Federal Judge Diane Humetewa, 40 HUMAN
RIGHTS 22, 22 (2015) (“A diverse federal judiciary increases the public’s trust in
our legal system and ensures equality under the law.”).
73. Jennifer L. Peresie, Note, Female Judges Matter: Gender and Collegial
Decisionmaking in the Federal Appellate Courts, 114 YALE L. J. 1759, 1778 (2005)
(“[A]dding a female judge to the panel more than doubled the probability that a
male judge ruled for the plaintiff in sexual harassment cases (increasing the
probability from 16% to 35%) and nearly tripled this probability in sex
discrimination cases (increasing it from 11% to 30%).”). But see Mitu Gulati,
Stephen Choi, Mirya Holman & Eric Posner, Judging Women, 8 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 504, 527 (2011) (concluding that “female judges and male judges
perform about the same,” even when they make decisions regarding “traditionally
women-focused subjects”).
74. See, e.g., NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS & ETHNIC
FAIRNESS, FINAL REPORT 1–13 (1997) (reporting comparatively few instances of
judicial bias, but finding considerably more instances of bias reported by criminal
practitioners); FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 169 (1990) (“Although we have confidence that the
quality of the federal bench and the nature of federal law keep such problems to
a minimum, it is unlikely that the federal judiciary is totally exempt from
instances of [bias].”).
75. Sylvia Lazos, Only Skin Deep?: The Cost of Partisan Politics on Minority
Diversity of the Federal Bench, 83 IND. L. J. 1423, 1442 (2008) (detailing George
W. Bush’s appointments of numerous African-American and Latina/o appellate
and district court judges and how partisan politics can undermine minority
judicial representation); Jeffrey Toobin, The Obama Brief, NEW YORKER (Oct. 27,
2014), https://perma.cc/2P54-8GWU (“Thirty-six per cent of President Obama’s
judges have been minorities, compared with eighteen per cent for Bush and
twenty-four per cent for Clinton.”) (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
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No plausible reason actually supports the Trump
Administration’s failure to improve judicial diversity. For example,
conservative, accomplished individuals of color, women and
LGBTQ persons—specifically Trump confirmees Michael Park,
Terry Moorer, Rodolfo Ruiz and Mary Rowland, combined with
Diane Gujarati who continues to await confirmation—undermine
the notion that appointing copious ethnic minority, female and
LGBTQ nominees confines merit, as the “pool” is minuscule. 76 His
confirmees and nominees thus far show that plentiful superb
choices distinctly offer merit and conservatism. Trump need only
realize this potential.
By omitting and deemphasizing cogent rules and conventions
with quick approval of so many conservative, young and competent
appellate court jurists, Trump undercut the discharge of
presidential constitutional responsibilities to nominate and
confirm talented judges for the eighty-six trial level openings and
the fifty district court emergencies. Prompt confirmation of
analogous candidates by diluting blue slips and violating or
constricting related profitable ideas erodes the Senate
constitutional duty to advise and consent. The vacancies’
monumental number and protracted character distinctly impair
the judiciary’s responsibility to expeditiously, inexpensively and
equitably resolve civil and criminal litigation. 77
In sum, Trump has nominated plenty of choices and seated
manifold circuit jurists, who are quite conservative, young and
capable, but the White House and the chamber perverted and
downplayed constructive solutions that have recently produced
approvals, which mean that eighty-seven openings plague many
Washington and Lee Law Review).
76. Tobias, supra note 7, at 908–09 n. 151 (providing additional
accomplished, conservative appointees); sources supra notes 38–40
(demonstrating the dearth of minority appointees by Trump), infra note 83 and
accompanying text (suggesting that Trump could renominate diverse nominees
who secured 2016 committee approval).
77. See sources supra notes 70–71 (regarding the courts’ responsibility to
litigants to speedily resolve disputes). Nonstop, ideological emphasis in the
judicial selection process can make judges resemble politicians and erode public
trust. Mar. 7 Meeting, supra note 44; Tonja Jacobi & Matthew Sag, The New Oral
Argument: Justices As Advocates, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1161, 1186 (2019);
PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY, Confirmed Judges, Confirmed Fears (2019),
https://perma.cc/L9JJ-4AF4.
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federal districts today. New York must confront twelve, eight of
which implicate emergencies; Trump did not confirm a single
district court nominee until October and merely appointed one
New York Second Circuit judge before May 2019. Therefore, the
last part surveys practices which address New York’s twelve trial
level vacancies.
V. Suggestions for the Future
Trump must capitalize on numerous effective techniques.
Thus far, his administration has invoked a few helpful
mechanisms. One was renaming seven talented district court
prospects with reports whose nominations expired this January
but drew April renewal. 78 That idea was efficient; the designees
have intensive committee, FBI, and ABA scrutiny, which requires
cursory updating, and compile easily discovered, thorough records,
while they must only capture panel and chamber votes. 79 The
suggestion is efficacious. New York merits appointing numerous
district jurists to increase the quality of justice administered by its
district courts. Fairness also mandates that nominees be promptly
reviewed; that every component of the Trump/in-state-politician
“deal” be honored and that court judicial resource distribution not
track the president’s shifting, malleable political necessities or
senator party affiliation. 80
78. Trump renamed fifty-four nominees during January 2019. Nevertheless,
the White House only sent April renominees to the Senate on May 21. Archive of
Judicial Vacancies, supra note 5; May 2018 Announcement, supra note 34.
79. The Senate Judiciary Committee has required that no renominees who
had hearings in the prior Congress—like Judges Brown and Gren Scholer—have
another. Tobias, supra note 7, at 911.
80. See sources supra notes 23, 32–34 (describing the disputes between the
Trump White House and Senators Gillibrand and Schumer over the home state
Second Circuit nominees), infra notes 108–10 and accompanying text (discussing
the efficacy of trading). Presidents and senators must honor their pledges when
formulating deals or they will not operate effectively. Burgess Everett &
Marianne Levine, Josh Hawley Rattles Republicans as He Derails GOP Judge,
POLITICO (June 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/BK7E-V5ZM (last updated June 12,
2019) (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (“[Michael] Bogren joins a small group of Trump
nominees, including Brett Talley, Jeff Mateer, Ryan Bounds and Thomas Farr,
who tanked amid opposition from Republicans,” and Bogren’s recent withdrawal
epitomizes deals that come unraveled) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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Trump could similarly recommend again certain of the
plentiful accomplished, conservative, and moderate, 2016 Obama
district court nominees whom the panel approved but lack
confirmation. 81 This may enable fast appointment, because those
nominees have to win merely committee and floor ballots. 82 Trump
renamed fifteen, including Gary R. Brown, his consensus Eastern
District nominee; most of these nominees secured appointment
while others can promote minority representation and fill district
openings. 83
A somewhat related concept which Trump uses is elevating
numbers of highly talented, centrist magistrate judges whom
Article III jurists in the district courts appoint for eight-year terms.
The construct is pragmatic and equitable, because these nominees
have compiled accessible, comprehensive records and develop
immense relevant experience. 84 Illustrations comprise Moorer, one
able Trump confirmee, and Gary R. Brown, his competent Eastern
District nominee. 85
Trump should revive or improve other effective procedures
that the White House currently omits and deemphasizes, including
consulting home state senators, prioritizing emergencies and
selecting diverse nominees. It would be crucial to assiduously
81. Tobias, supra note 26, at 18 (reviewing opportunity to preserve valuable
time, money and energy); Executive Business Meeting, S. COMM. JUDICIARY (June
20, 2019), https://perma.cc/7NPP-H884 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) [hereinafter
June 2019 Meeting] (approving Judge Brown, a renominee, with a voice vote) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
82. Tobias, supra note 26, at 18–19; see supra note 77 (discussing how the
committee, FBI, and ABA assessments of nominees only need updating).
83. Tobias, supra note 26, at 21–22 (providing examples of five others who
secured 2016 committee approval but lacked confirmation whom Trump has not
yet renominated). This concept is pragmatic, efficient and fair, as all individuals
have waited years, and this practice may facilitate appointments. Trump
renamed Gujarati in 2018, one of twenty-eight additional Obama nominees
lacking 2016 panel approval, yet only renominated her this April, even as Trump
has yet to renominate any other nominee who was among the twenty-eight. See
sources cited supra notes 34, 39.
84. 28 U.S.C. § 631 (2012); see also Tobias, supra note 7, at 910 (assessing
the practice of elevating district appointees to circuit positions). They also have
FBI background checks.
85. Carl Tobias, This Judicial Nominee Deserves a Vote, NEWSDAY (June 25,
2019), https://perma.cc/U3Y7-BFJV (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); Current Judicial Vacancies, supra note 29; see
also sources cited supra notes 33–34, 38–40, 81.
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consult home state politicians, which facilitates most nominations
and confirmations and is a major reason for blue slips. 86 The
successful confirmation of the seven highly capable, mainstream
New York district aspirants whom Trump renamed in April may
pertinently demonstrate the success of these procedures. 87
Although the maximum consultation will not always yield the
Republican and Democratic political parties’ strongest preferences,
the solution could spur more nominations and might resolve
disputes that can undermine the selection process and interparty
collaboration. 88 Those attributes show the profound exigency to
resume cooperative discussions which involve (1) those
renominees’ immediate appointment and (2) the expeditious
confirmation of judges to all of the remaining district positions,
several of which lack nominees.
Trump could rethink the quick approval of so many extremely
conservative, young appellate court jurists—which is the dominant
explanation for the colossal number of trial level openings across
the country and New York’s twelve district court vacancies—while
closely reviewing actions to decrease the unoccupied trial level
judgeships. For instance, he may want to prioritize nominees who
might remedy the plentiful New York emergencies. 89 Trump can
stress the myriad district court openings in New York, 90 and this
may help rectify the paucity of blue state confirmees and
nominees. 91
86. See sources cited supra notes 22–23, 41–46 (relating Senators
Gillibrand’s and Schumer’s blue slipping of Trump appellate court nominees and
Senator Grassley’s change to the appellate court blue slip policy).
87. All seven had smooth 2018 panel approval, no confirmation debate and
vote and April 2019 renomination. See sources cited supra notes 35, 44 (collecting
nominations and hearings). The Senate did confirm one of the district court
nominees, Rachel Kovner, in October. 165 CONG. REC. S5,829 (daily ed. Oct. 16,
2019). Another Trump district nominee, Thomas Marcelle whom the president
nominated to the Northern District of New York, withdrew ostensibly because
Sen. Gillibrand decided to retain her blue slip. See sources cited supra note 35.
88. See sources cited supra notes 22–23, 43–44 and accompanying text
(discussing New York and other states’ nomination disputes with the Trump
Administration White House).
89. See Judicial Emergencies, supra note 29 (listing the New York judicial
emergencies).
90. Id. (showing that California experiences thirteen vacancies, Illinois
encounters five and New Jersey confronts six).
91. Id. Trump should continue to follow home state senators’ proposals of
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The White House could also expand judicial diversity, which
marshals benefits that Park, Gujarati and Lan clearly exemplify;
New York demographics warrant promoting those advantages. 92
Trump can increase minority judicial representation and
communicate to all citizens and selection participants that he
favors enhanced diversity. The White House Counsel should head
this activity, conveying that representation has priority analogous
to conservatism. Cipollone could focus his efforts on the White
House Counsel Office, the Department of Justice, the Judiciary
Committee plus the New York senators, who would emphasize
diversity by meticulously pursuing and submitting numerous fine,
conservative minority attorneys. 93 Counsel next might interview
and proffer these choices, asking that Trump seriously
contemplate naming all of them. Trump may lead by example with
his nominations, convincing politicians to support and promptly
consider individuals whom the administration tenders.
In short, the president and the Senate must evaluate
near-term procedures which might curb the significant New York
vacancies and may quell the persistent confirmation wars. The
latter are reflected by (1) the White House eschewing consultation
and delaying renomination of seven, plus naming of six more, New
York trial level candidates, (2) Democrats’ rarely agreeing on
confirmation votes, and frequently demanding roll call ballots, and
(3) the chamber’s substantially alterating court of appeals slips
well qualified, mainstream picks, even though the many well qualified New York
nominees arguably mean that Trump and the Senate could have less need for
expert ABA input. ABA STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY, RATINGS OF
ARTICLE III AND ARTICLE IV JUDICIAL NOMINEES 116TH CONGRESS (2019),
https://perma.cc/Y7LZ-T6N3; ABA STANDING COMM. ON FEDERAL JUDICIARY,
RATINGS OF ARTICLE III AND ARTICLE IV JUDICIAL NOMINEES 115TH CONGRESS
(2018), https://perma.cc/BY3Z-DX5D.
92. See generally Beiner, supra note 72 (examining the effect of diversity on
the judiciary); McCain & Flake, supra note 72 (same); Peresie, supra note 73
(same); NINTH CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON RACIAL, RELIGIOUS & ETHNIC FAIRNESS,
supra note 74 (same); see also Apr. 2019 Announcement, supra note 35
(renominating Gujarati); Jan. 2019 Announcement, supra note 35 (renaming
Park); Nov. 2019 Announcement, supra note 35 (announcing the nomination of
Lan).
93. For the senators’ ongoing efforts and more recommendations for
expanding diversity, see Carl Tobias, Appointing Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,
Transgender and Queer Judges in the Trump Administration, 96 WASH. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 11, 16, 20-22 (2018).
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and dramatically reducing trial level nominee debate hours from
thirty to two. 94 Many concerns show that 2019 is past time for
effectuating solutions that would permanently improve the failing
rules and customs. 95
Trump and senators might change the present system with a
bipartisan judiciary that allows the party which lacks the chief
executive to afford a comparatively small percentage of
designees. 96 New York senators introduced this construct in the
1970s. 97 Pennsylvania supplies a modern example. 98 What New
York recently did may accurately be conceptualized as a bipartisan
court process. For instance, Trump apparently championed four
appeals court nominees and the senators forwarded most of the
trial level candidates. The nomination procedures functioned
rather smoothly, but tardily. Yet the appointment practices
followed with Second Circuit Judges Joseph Bianco, Michael Park
and Steven Menashi and many district choices performed less
suitably; Trump partly addressed the final complication by
94. John Gramlich, Judicial Picks Have Become More Contentious, and
Trump’s Are No Exception, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Mar. 7, 2018),
https://perma.cc/Q5C4-L8XX (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); sources cited supra notes 22–23, 35, 41–44,
56, 59, 63–64.
95. Longer-term suggestions for improvement warrant 2020 adoption,
because limited clarity on the outcome of White House and Senate elections
provides incentives to agree—neither party knows who will benefit from the
agreement. For more longer-term recommendations, see Michael Shenkman,
Decoupling District from Circuit Judge Nominations: A Proposal to Put Trial
Bench Confirmations on Track, 65 ARK. L. REV. 217, 298-311 (2012); Tobias, supra
note 18, at 2255–65.
96. Michael Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667,
688 (2003) (listing alternative arrangements reached between past presidents
and senators); Carl Tobias, Fixing the Federal Judicial Selection Process, 65
EMORY L. J. ONLINE 2051 (2016) (arguing that President Obama could have
benefited from a similar arrangement).
97. The New York senator whose party lacked the presidency recommended
one in three or four nominees. Tobias, supra note 7, at 915 n.182 (citing JOAN
BISKUPIC, BREAKING IN: THE RISE OF SONIA SOTOMAYOR AND THE POLITICS OF
JUSTICE 59 (2014)).
98. Id. at 916 (“Senators Bob Casey (D) and Pat Toomey (R) now rely on
bipartisan merit-selection panels, which have canvassed and chosen individuals
since 2011 . . . .”). Additional jurisdictions, namely California and Illinois, apply
comparatively similar regimes. Id.; see sources cited supra notes 32–35, 40
(showing four California, and three Illinois, district nominees whom Trump
renamed in January and April).
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renaming this April the seven nominees who enjoyed June
committee approval but six of those nominees still await
confirmation debates and ballots. 99
Politicians should yoke bipartisan courts to legislation which
authorizes additional New York district jurists. 100 That may
institute
Judicial
Conference
of
the
United
States
recommendations for lawmakers, which the policymaking arm of
the federal courts astutely derives from conservative work and
case load estimates that increase judicial resources. 101 Those
actions should become effective in 2021. 102 Linking a bipartisan
judiciary with four new posts will yield sound benefits. Bipartisan
courts and more judgeships would grant each party incentives to
cooperate, result in the nomination and confirmation of jurists who
manifest diverse expertise, ideology, ethnicity, gender and sexual
orientation, and increase court judicial resources. Fall 2020
adoption with implementation the next year can limit either
party’s unfair advantage, yet initiation might need care, 103 because
execution may actually be rather complex. 104
Should these proposals falter, as the GOP impedes Democrats’
selection endeavors, 105 the chamber minority could apply relatively
99. June 2019 Meeting, supra note 81; see sources cited supra notes 67, 96
(including more specific explanation of bipartisan courts and trades, such as the
New York senators and Trump each proposing some for the three New York
district court vacancies which still lack nominees). Because the White House
consulted the New York senators about Judge Richard Sullivan, who seemed to
be comparatively moderate, the jurist’s nomination and confirmation processes
proceeded comparatively smoothly.
100. REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED
STATES: MAR. 12, 2019, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. 26-27 (2019); Carl
Tobias, Filling the D.C. Circuit Vacancies, 91 IND. L. J. 121, 140 (2015).
101. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., supra note 100; see Federal Judgeship
Act of 2013, S. 1385, 113th Cong. (2013) (providing the most recent comprehensive
judgeships legislation).
102. See supra note 95 and accompanying text (asserting that when the
parties reach agreement before the elections, neither party knows which may
benefit from the results).
103. Tobias, supra note 7, at 917–18 (offering more comprehensive treatment
of numerous specific issues that can arise).
104. Congress can address numerous concerns. Id. at 918. Some customs,
such as votes on many able, centrist district nominees at recesses, could restore
regular order.
105. Slowly renaming the seven 2018 New York district court nominees,
minimally consulting the New York Democratic senators on six additional
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drastic relief. Promising ideas emerge from blue slips, despite
restrictions pertaining to courts of appeals. 106 Democrats might
choose to not return slips on district prospects in home states, until
Trump proffers aspirants whom home state politicians may favor.
The New York legislators urged renaming the seven 2018
nominees, which the White House ultimately did, but the
lawmakers have three other vacancies that they can insist be filled
by people whom both recommend. 107 Democrats might also retain
slips for every district court nominee pending Republican
agreement on honoring appellate court slips. 108 Collective action
involving their powerful leverage derived from eighty-seven empty
district court positions and merely one appellate court opening
may prompt the GOP to accede. 109
A related possible solution is “trades.” 110 For example, the New
York court nominee packages show that Trump and the legislators
each proposed a number of picks. 111 The White House confirmed
three appellate court jurists opposed by the lawmakers, who
apparently submitted most of the trial court nominees. 112 Yet,
openings, slowly nominating candidates for those vacancies, rejecting appellate
court slips and slashing post-cloture district nominee debate time demonstrate
how Republican senators undermine Democrats’ work as well as Senate rules and
customs.
106. See sources cited supra notes 41–44. I depend substantially here and
below on the perspectives of Christopher Kang, who spearheaded many of
President Obama’s White House judicial nomination and confirmation initiatives.
Jeremy Stahl, Republicans Are Abolishing Judicial Appointment Norms Again,
SLATE (Feb. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/GF3F-3MU5 (last visited Nov. 4, 2019) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
107. See id. (claiming that Democrats less avidly champion their candidates
with Trump than Republican senators did with Obama).
108. Id.; see sources cited supra notes 22–23, 41–44. The GOP denied Judge
Garland and seven Obama circuit nominees final votes in 2016); Everett &
Levine, supra note 59 (describing how Schumer offered honoring the slips for twohour district debates but Republicans refused).
109. Stahl, supra note 106 (“What individual senators can do is commit to
withhold them for vacancies in their states.”); Current Judicial Vacancies, supra
note 29 (showing that there is merely one appellate court vacancy throughout the
country); see August 2019 Announcement, supra note 32.
110. See sources cited supra notes 32–35, 67, 96.
111. Trades, bipartisan courts and the ideas in the above paragraph about
collective action apparently overlap. See sources cited supra notes 96–109.
112. Judges Park and Menashi appear to be extremely conservative and they
are young; Judges Sullivan and Bianco, the other New York Second Circuit
judges, were Bush district appointees who seem comparatively moderate. See
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“judge trading” might trigger deleterious impacts: the appeals
court prospects lacked slips but won fast appointment while the
president could only rename this April the district nominees with
2018 reports, making the nominees wait a protracted time for
confirmation in the Republican-controlled Senate. 113 Similar
issues plague Senate work “boycotting” that can publicize and
clarify adverse effects of the GOP’s obstruction, yet boycotts could
signal defeat and the problems that they create may surpass the
benefits. 114
VI. Conclusion
President Trump and the Republican Senate majority have
worsened the tendentious confirmation wars. New York has been
a prominent front, which illustrates the systemic morass, precisely
epitomized by the White House’s dilatory renaming of the seven
district court nominees and mustering of nominees for the multiple
remaining openings which lack them. Nonetheless, the president
and the chamber should productively treat the desperate straits
with prompt approval of the remaining six of the seven highly
competent, moderate nominees and concerted activities that
confirm accomplished, mainstream jurists for the other vacancies,

sources supra notes 44, 66–67 (showing that consultation works through
Sullivan’s confirmation). Practically all of the district nominees apparently are
comparatively centrist.
113. See sources supra notes 35, 44, 66–67; Tobias, supra note 18, at 2260
n.126 (suggesting trades for lengthy vacancies during the Obama Administration,
but affording examples of controversy surrounding trades). The district nominees
whom Trump renamed in April may only be confirmed after the Senate considers
many other nominees. Indeed, the Senate has confirmed merely one nominee,
Judge Kovner, and that happened in October. See supra note 87 and
accompanying text. Moreover, the November 2019 nominees, Cronan and Lan,
will not receive confirmation this year. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
Because 2020 is a presidential election year when the confirmation process slows
and halts, the November nominees and certain of the April 2019 renominees may
encounter difficulty attaining confirmation. Finally, the three vacancies that lack
nominees could remain open until 2021. Accordingly, trades should be reserved
for dire situations.
114. Thus, boycotts should be a last resort. See Stahl, supra note 106
(discussing whether eliminating blue slips could allow Trump to “run completely
roughshod” over district court nominations).
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thus providing a constructive
appointments nationwide.

roadmap

for

bipartisan

